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by returning the exam which he received
. from A well before taking the re-examination, B attempted to show good faith and
lack of intent to gain an unfair advantage.
Without deciding all the issues presented to the Court by the prosecution

and defense, the Court holds that the
prosecution did not successfully meet its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that B's conduct was dishonorable.
Any presumption of dishonorable conduct
was erased by B's unassailed testimony

that he did not know of the Professor's
restrictive policy as to availability of previous exams at the time of receiving the
copy from A.
In conclusion, B was found not guilty of
violating sec. 3.03 of the Code.

Supreme· Court
Decisions

Lawyer

Advertising
Given
Go-Ahead
by Glenn A. Jacobson

Be it bane or godsend to the legal profession, the Supreme Court has given the
green light to the formerly blasphemous
practice of lawyers advertising their services. Self-regulation by member-run professional organizations was the traditional
means of guaranteeing the public that
they would receive good value for their
money and quality work when they retained a lawyer. But, the exclusive
watchdog function of these organizations
has now been eroded by the wave of consumerism. The most recent example of

this trend is the case of Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
In 1974, John R. Bates and Van
a'Steen, having been members of the
Arizona Bar for two years, opened a law
practice in Phoenix, Arizona which they
referred to as a "legal clinic." A major
goal of this practice was "to provide legal
services at modest fees to persons of
moderate income who did not qualify for
governmental legal aid." 97 S.Ct. at
2694.
The clinic accepted only routine matters such as uncontested separations and
divorces, personal bankruptcies, name
changes, and uncontested adoptions,
making extensive use of paralegal assistants and standardized forms to facilitate a
quick flow of business.
Two years later, "appellants concluded
that their practice and clinical concept
could not survive unless the availability of
legal services at low cost was advertised
and, in particular, fees were advertised."
97 S.Ct. at 2694. an February 22, 1976,
Bates and a'Steen placed their advertisement in the Arizona Republic, a Phoenix
daily newspaper, offering "legal services
at very reasonable fees" and listing particular services and corresponding fees.
In response, the President of the
Arizona State Bar initiated proceedings
against Bates and a'Steen, alleging that
their advertisement was in violation of
Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of
Arizona, 17 Arizona Stat. (1976 Supp.),
p. 26. The disciplinary rule provides in
part:
"(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any

other lawyer through newspaper .,.
advertisements .... "
A three member Special Local Administrative Committee held a hearing, pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 33,
but declined to consider an attack on the
valildity of the rule. However, the committee did recommend that both Bates
and a'Steen be suspended from the practice of law for at least six months. Shortly
thereafter, the Board of Governors of the
Arizona State Bar, pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 36, reviewed the case and
recommended one week suspensions to
each appellant.
Bates and a'Steen sought review of the
case in the Arizona Supreme Court alleging that the disciplinary rule they had ignored was both violative of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act and an infringement of
their First Amendment rights. The
Arizona Supreme Court rejected both
claims, and the Supreme Court of the
United States consented to hear the case.
429 U.S. 813 (1976).
The Supreme Court's decision in the
Bates case focused on an analysis of the
allegation that First Amendment Rights
were being interfered with by the continued enforcement of Arizona Supreme
Court Rule 20. This analysis is an extension of previous Supreme Court decisions
acknowledging First Amendment protection for commercial speech. Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
In Bigelow, the managing editor of a
Virginia newspaper was found guilty of

OCTOBER, 1977

[!1J

violating a state statute which prohibited
the advertising of information which
might " ... encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage ... " Va.
Code Ann. 18.1-63 (1960). The Court
stated:
"The central assumption made by the
Supreme Court of Virginia was that the
First Amendment guarantees of speech
and press are inapplicable to paid commercial advertisements. Our cases,
however, clearly establish that speech
is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in
that form." 421 U.S. at 818.
The Supreme Court was willing to
place commercial speech under the protection of the First Amendment because
such communication may contain information of potential interest and value to
the public.
In 1976, the case of Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, expanded the doctrine. Here, the Court held
that the advertising of drug prices by state
licensed pharmacists was permissible and
protected by the First Amendment. The
Court reaffirmed its earlier position: " ...
speech does not lose its First Amendment
protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisment of one
form or another." 425 U.S. at 761.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,
an essential issue was whether an act
prohibited by the regulating body of a
profession could be classified under the
doctrine of commercial free speech and '
consequently be afforded First Amendment protection. The Court expressed its
belief that "the advertising ban does not
directly affect professional standards one
way or the other". 425 U.S. at 769.
In light of the Bigelow and Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy cases, Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona is a logical consequence of the elevation of commercial
speech to constitutionally protected communication. Because the Bill of Rights
prevailed over the commandment of a
self-regulating professional organization,
the public's right to be informed emerges
as the champion in this case. The Court
pointedly stated that they felt the Arizona
disciplinary rule was violative of the First
Amendment, "... the disciplinary rule
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serves to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to keep the public in
ignorance." 97 S.Ct. at 2700.
It is important to note that the decisions in both Pharmacy and Bates will
relate to the advertising of prices. Only
routine legal services lend themselves to
advertising: the uncontested divorce, the
simple adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy, and the change of
name-the types of services advertised by
the appellants. The Court later eliminated
any question as to the scope of permissible advertising by indicating that advertisements which are false, deceptive, or
misleading dre subject to restraint as are
advertised claims concerning the quality
of the services to be performed. "In holding that advertising by attorneys may not
be subjected to blanket suppression, and
that the advertisement at issue is protected, we, of course do not hold that advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in any way." 97 S.Ct. at 2708.
The heart of the commercial free
speech issue appears to be the public's
right to information which will enable
each consumer to make informed and
reliable decisions. "Commercial speech

serves to inform the public of the
availability, nature, and prices of products
and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system." 97
S.Ct. at 2699.
The Bates decision should act as a
catalyst for the open and reliable dissemination of information at a time when
the stature of many professionals,
especially attorneys, is diminishing. A
well informed marketplace can facilitate
the extension of services to those who
need them but are unsure of their
availability.
However, notice of the availability of
services through price advertising does
not eradicate the important question of
quality and appropriateness of service.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bates,
while opening up many new doors, may
also serve to add new clouds of uncertainty to confuse those who were to have been
helped. Mr. Chief Justice Berger, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
warned:
"Because legal services can rarely, if
ever be 'standardized' and because potential clients rarely know in advance

'What lire yo II tryillgto ri.fl-ruill the mllmbn-jumbn rllcket1:

what services they do in fact need,
price advertising can never give the
public an accurate picture on which to
base the selection of an attorney. Indeed, in the context of legal services,
such incompleted information could be
worse than no information at all. It
could be a trap for the unwary." 97
S.Ct. at 2710.
Unquestionably, the Supreme Court's
decision in Bates will have a far reaching
effect on the professionals's relationship
with those who need unique services. The
consumer has now the opportunity to
select an attorney based on the cost of the
services provided. Now the question must
be whether the legal profession will support or reject the Court's belief that dissemination of limited information, so long
as it is accurate, is better than continued
public ignorance and professional secrecy.

cease and desist such action or suffer untold consequences. The Commission did
not choose to enlighten the attorneys as
to exactly how they were violating the
Code. A formal grievance was not at that
time filed.
Legum, Cochran & Chartrand responded that they would not discontinue
publication of their announcement and

their position, the young associates innocently bantered among themselves of
possible adverse Bar Association reaction.
Imagine their consternation when they
received a letter from the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland instructing them that they were believed to be in
violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and commanding them to
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CHARTRAND,

ANNOUNCE THAT

MARTHA WYATT

IS NOW ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIRM
IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW

ALAN HILLIARD LEGUM

208 DUKE OF GLOUCESTER ST.

GILL COCHRAN

Bates:
A Local

301 263-3001

MARTHA WYATT
JULY 1, 1977

[B]
On June 27, 1977 the Supreme Court
of the United States decided the case of
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct.
2691 (1977), regarding legal advertising.
Those who thought the controversy over
advertising in the legal profession would
be settled by this decision were very much
mistaken.
On July 8, 1977 the Annapolis law firm
of LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND,
P.A. ran ad "A" in The Evening Capital.
This so-called advertisement merely
announced the addition of a new associate
to the firm. Maryland is one ()f relatively
few jurisdictions which still prohibits such
announcements in newspapers. Despite
Maryland's minority stance on announcement type ads the members of the firm
felt confident that their ad would be
above reproach. They regarded the ad as
entirely within the Bates decision on the
theory that permitting advertisement of
prices of routine legal services presumes
advertisement of existence. Confident in

ANNAPOLIS, MD. 21401

GEORGEJ.CHARTRAND

Response
by Carol A. Robertson

P.A.

LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND, PA
Attorneys at Law

208 Duke of Gloucester Street
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
263-3001
LEGAL SERVICES AT REASONABLE FEES

Simple Uncomplicated Will (No Trust Provisions) ............ .
Uncontested Divorce (No Dispute Concerning Grounds for Divorce)
Simple Separation Agreement (Without Negotiation) .........
Simple Power of Attorney ..............................
Preparation of Real Estate Sales Contract ..................
Preparation of Simple Deed .............................
Brankruptcy Preceedings-IndividualNonbusiness, Uncontested
Proceedings ......................................
Change of Name (Uncontested) ..........................
Adoption (Uncontested) ................................

$

35.00

.
.
.
.

250.00
100.00
25.00
25.00
15.00

.
.
.

350.00
75.00
250.00

The fee charges in other types of cases and in contested cases will depend on and
vary according to the individual circumstances of that case. The above fees are in
addition to court costs as assessed by the Clerk of Court.
Hours: Monday, Wednesday and Friday-9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Tuesday and Thursday-9 a.m. to 7 p.m.
Saturday-By appointment.
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